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ABSTRACT
This paper introduces a Markov chain model for Islamic micro-financing, especially 
mudarabah and murababah contracts. Mudarabah and murabahah are two Islamic micro-
financing contracts that have enormous potential in creating a balance between the 
monetary and sharia sector because the two products are moving to manage the 
business sector, which undoubtedly adds value to the economic movement directly. 
On the other hand, both contracts have the potential to cause problems in their 
implementation, notably the asymmetric information that consists of adverse selection 
and moral hazard. We propose the Markov chain model as a solution for the Islamic 
banks to reduce the risk due to adverse selection and moral hazard in mudarabah and 
murabahah contracts. In our model, we also propose a mechanism to avoid strategic 
default in a mudarabah contract. We observed two different probabilities of an 
applicant to become a beneficiary to find the solution to the problems. The results 
of this study reveal that the bank could decrease the probability of an applicant to 
become a beneficiary to reduce the adverse selection and moral hazard in mudarabah 
and murabahah contracts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Microcredit has developed in poor countries as well as in richer countries, 
including those of Muslim-majority. High unemployment, poverty, and difficulties 
of financial access have an impact on increasing demand for microcredit in the 
Muslim-majority countries, most notably Bangladesh and Indonesia (Khaled, 
2011). Along with the development of microcredit in Muslim-majority countries, 
controversies over the conventional microcredit systems are inevitable. Islam 
forbids riba (usury/interest). Qur’an explicitly explains this. Many Islamic (micro) 
finance institutions are developing Islamic micro-financing now. They develop 
Islamic finance in several types of contracts according to the client’s requirements. 
Some type of contracts in Islamic micro-financing is murabahah, ijarah, musyarakah, 
and mudarabah.
Mudarabah and murabahah are two Islamic micro-financing contracts that have 
enormous potential in creating a balance between the monetary and sharia sectors 
because both products have gradually infiltrated the business sector, which 
undoubtedly adds value to the economic movement directly. As the need for 
Islamic micro-financing increases, various problems arise in its implementation, 
including in mudarabah and murabahah contracts. The most common problem is 
asymmetric information, which consists of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
In a paper (Redone and Yaman, 2018), they have done a study in the Indonesian 
Islamic banking industry about asymmetric information problems in mudarabah 
and murabahah contracts. Previous studies have discussed such problems (Tag El-
Din, 2008; Ismal, 2009; Kamarudin & Ismal, 2013; Yousfi, 2013; Nouman & Ullah, 
2014; Fakir & Thiout, 2016; Sapuan, 2016; and Jouaber & Mehri, 2017). In some of 
the papers, it was explained that adverse selection occurs because the banks do 
not know the applicant’s character so that the banks make mistakes in choosing 
clients, while moral hazard occurs when the clients do not give the right financial 
report. Such problems are risky for Islamic banks. Adverse selection occurs before 
contract transactions between bank and applicant, while moral hazard occurs 
during the contract period possibly due to adverse selection.
In this paper, we propose the Markov chain model for mudarabah and 
murabahah contracts. A definition of Markov chain by Mills in Chan and Lenard 
(2012): “Markov chains are a mathematical model that use concepts from probability to 
describe how a system changes from one state to another”. By applying this model in 
a mudarabah contract, the Islamic bank can estimate or determine the number of 
applicants to become beneficiary to reduce adverse selection or moral hazard. 
Furthermore, in mudarabah and murabahah contracts, the Islamic bank can estimate 
the total profit of beneficiary and the total profit of the bank, calculating the 
proportion of beneficiaries in a population at equilibrium. By recognizing the total 
profit of beneficiary and bank, and the proportion of beneficiaries at an equilibrium 
condition, the Islamic bank can decide to reduce or avoid adverse selection and 
moral hazard.
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1.2. Objective
As far as the objective of this paper is concerned, we propose the Markov chain 
model as a solution for the bank to reduce the risk due to adverse selection and 
moral hazard in mudarabah and murabahah contracts. In this model, the bank 
can calculate the expectation of beneficiary profits and the expectation of bank 
profits during some contract periods, both affected by certain probabilities. We 
also propose a mechanism to avoid a moral hazard in a mudarabah contract. The 
Markov chain model also allows a system of sustainable credit for the beneficiary 
who is successful in reimbursing the credit, as expected by beneficiaries.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews about the 
mathematical model of mudarabah and murabah contracts. Section III discusses 
Markov chain model in mudarabah and murabahah contracts. Section IV, we calculate 
the proportion of the beneficiaries in a population at equilibrium. Section V, we 
propose the condition of the absence of strategic default in a mudarabah contract. 
In section VI, we show the simulation results of models and analyze the results. 
Finally, section VII concluded the study and give the recommendations for future 
study.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Background Theory
2.1.1. Markov Chain
Let {X0, X1, X2,…} be a sequence of discrete random variables. Then {X0, X1, X2,…} 
is Markov chain    if
 (1)
for all t=1,2,3,…  and all states i0, i1, …, it-1, i,j.
We can interpret equation (1) that, the conditional distribution of any future 
state Xt+1, given the past states X0, X1, …, Xt-1 and the present Xt, is independent of 
the past states and depends only on the present state, which is called the Markov 
property. The value Pij represents the probability that the process will, when in 
state i, next make a transition into state j.1 
As far as the application of Markov chain is concerned particularly in a contract 
of Islamic micro-financing, the model is built by determining the probabilities of 
applicant’s or beneficiary’s movements, such as the probability of an applicant 
to become a beneficiary, the probability of a client succeeding in reimbursing a 
credit, and the probability of a client fails to reimburse a credit. The probability of 
an applicant to become a beneficiary will affect the probability of adverse selection, 
while the probability of the client fails to reimburse a credit is the probability of 
risk, it can occur due to adverse selection or moral hazard. The bank can determine 
the probability of an applicant to become a beneficiary from applications of loans.
1  The references of Markov chain are from Ross (1996) and Fewster (2014).
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2.1.2. Mudarabah
A Mudarabah contract is a form of partnership between rabb al-mal (capital provider) 
who contributes capital and mudarib (beneficiary) who contributes efforts in the 
form of managerial skill or work. The profit of business is shared between the 
capital provided and the beneficiary according to the mutually agreed profit 
sharing ratio in the contract. If the beneficiary loses then losses are born solely by 
the capital provider, provided such loss is not due to the beneficiary’s negligence 
(Bank Negara Malaysia, 2009).
Example 1:
A beneficiary makes a mudarabah contract with an Islamic bank that agrees to 
provide RM100000 financing. Profit sharing between the beneficiary and the bank 
in a ratio of 70:30 respectively. If the profit is RM40000, the beneficiary recovers 
RM100000 capital and shares RM12000 profit. If the loss is RM20000, the bank 
bears the loss of RM20000, and the beneficiary covers the RM180000 capital.
2.1.3. Murabahah 
Murabahah is the most popular Islamic finance contract used in business and asset 
financing. The bank purchases the goods to the beneficiary, then the beneficiary 
will pay according to the price and date agreed by two parties (Hussain et al, 2015).
Example 2: 
The bank buys $100000 worth of wood for a customer who is a manufacturer. 
According to the agreement of two parties, the manufacturer must pay to the bank 
$120000 for one year (Jamaldeen, undated).
2.2. Previous Studies
Khodr et al (2009) introduced a Markov Chain model for conventional microcredit 
in a paper about a mathematical model for microlending. In this paper, they 
calculated the expected total profit of the borrower. They also presented the 
condition of absence of strategic default to avoid failure to reimburse a loan, 
introduced by Tedeschi (2006).
On the other hand, some studies proposed asymmetric information problem 
solving by using the mathematical modeling in mudarabah and mudarabah contract. 
Jouaber and Mehri (2017) calculated the expected payoff to Islamic Venture 
Capital (IVC) and the beneficiary. They calculated it in two cases, without adverse 
selection, and under adverse selection. They optimized profit sharing ratio to 
avoid the adverse selection problem between the IVC and the beneficiary, and to 
improve the profit of a venture.
Studies done by Yousfi (2013), he presented the model without moral hazard 
and the model under moral hazard in a mudarabah contract. He optimized the 
contract under moral hazard by maximizing the expected gain of the beneficiary. 
Ismal (2009) presented a model of mudarabah contract by making the selection 
criteria model when the Islamic banking selects the business partners to become a 
client and build the model to make a financial decision in mudarabah contract. As 
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far as the main purpose of the research is concerned, he wanted to find models for 
minimizing moral hazard because some clients wanted to get profit by pretending 
to be a default. The Islamic banks would investigate the clients about moral hazard. 
He found formulas to calculate the profit when the moral hazard is not found and 
the moral hazard is found by the bank’s investigations.
Other than that, other papers discuss the mathematical model of mudarabah 
contract and murabahah contracts.
The model presented by Tag El-Din (2008) is the comparison of return and 
risk model of mudarabah contract with four other contracts of the return and risk 
models, namely the pure borrowing model, the partial borrowing contract, the 
pure hiring contract, and the partial hiring contract. For determining the risk 
and return models of types of contracts, he used the expected (mean) formula 
for calculating the return and the variance formula for calculating the risk. In this 
research, mudarabah is used as a comparison for the other four types of contracts. 
One of the results of research is the profit and sharing of mudarabah cannot be 
manipulated freely through monetary policy without affecting the client’s interest 
in choosing mudarabah contract.
Moreover, Zandi & Arifin (2012) described the model of the practical 
framework of mudarabah in Iran. The Iranian banks offer installment sales facility 
for buying commodity. They showed the profit of bank formula and the monthly 
installments amount formula used by the Iranian banks.
On the other hand, Kamarudin and Ismail (2013) showed two models of 
mudarabah contracts. The first model describes the Islamic bank as a capital 
provider, and the second model the depositor deposit money at Islamic bank 
for a mudarabah contract. Therefore, the bank can observe the outcomes, and the 
customer only knows about the profit sharing ratio. They used the probability 
distribution on actual profit/income to build the models. The result of the research, 
the Islamic bank could get maximum profit and provide an incentive to be an 
entrepreneur if the Islamic bank receives higher profit than their expectation from 
the project.
Omar and Jaffar (2016) proposed a continuous model stochastic mudarabah 
investment by creating the stochastic differential equation to find the solution of 
equity of the capital provider and the equity of the entrepreneur. By using the 
model, the investment of parties will be predicted when the capital is invested in 
the stock market. 
Further, Fakir and Thiuoat (2016) applied the Hersanyi model to create a model 
of mudarabah contract. They used probability theory to build the model. They 
calculated the sharing ratio of mudarabah for Islamic banks with high expertise and 
the Islamic bank with low expertise, and then they calculated the expected profit 
of the client.
Jatmiko et al. (2017) built three models in mudarabah contract, namely the 
modeling the supply side, the modelling the consumers, and the market clearing 
condition. In the modeling, the supply side and the modelling the consumers 
maximized the present value of its future cash flow and found the solution 
conservative, the internal optimum discount rate, and the internal optimum 
discount rate for consumers. They also found the solution of the third model, i.e., 
market cleaning condition to evaluate the optimal mudarabah discount rate.
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III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data
In simulating our model, we used data of example 1 for simulations of the 
Markov chain model of mudarabah contracts and we used data of example 2 for the 
simulations of the Markov chain model of murabahah contracts. Additionally, we 
chose the value of variables that matched the needs of our model. We simulated 
the model by using SCILAB, which provides a tool (as a command) to call the 
Markov chain to generate data of the dynamic evolution of the states.
3.2. Model Development
3.2.1. Markov Chain Model of A Mudarabah Contract
In this section, we will build a model of mudarabah contract by using the Markov 
chain. In this model, there are two states: A as the state of being an applicant, and 
B a beneficiary. The Islamic bank offers a loan to an applicant who becomes a 
beneficiary with probability γ, she 2 passes state A to state B. If she is unsuccessful 
to become a beneficiary, she stays at state A with probability 1-γ, she can apply 
again to ask for a loan. A beneficiary can repay her loan, she stays at state B with 
probability 1-ε, and she can get a loan again. If she loses, she returns to state A to 
ask for a loan again with probability ε. Such rules can be summarized in a Markov 
chain (Xt)t∈Ν with the set of states S≔{A,B}, where Xt∈S. The Markov chain model 
of mudarabah contract can be illustrated by the following picture:
We can also describe the model into the transition matrix  Pd:
We consider the case where the bank can give a loan K for a beneficiary. The 
beneficiary will do some production activities with the loan. To illustrate, in the 
production activities, she spends some money for consumption c. After completing 
the production activities, she gets income Y(K).
2  Muhammad Yunus is the pioneer of microcredit. He founded Grameen Bank that lent money to the 
poorest especially the women in Bangladesh in 1976. In this paper, we change the word “beneficiary” 
with the word “she”.
Figure 1. 
Markov Chain Model of Mudarabah Contract
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In the case where the beneficiary gets a profit from her business Y(K)-(c+K), she 
must divide the profit with the bank in a certain value depending on the contract. 
We consider a bank’s portion for profits as ρ and a beneficiary’s portion of profits 
as 1-ρ, so she must reimburse the capital K plus ρ(Y(K)-(c+K)). The beneficiary gains 
profit, (1-ρ)(Y(K)-(c+K)). In the case where the beneficiary loses, where c+K>Y(K), 
she gains nothing and the bank loses (c+K)-Y(K).
In the mudarabah contract, we consider the financial flow function f:SxS→R. 
The beneficiary profits for one period in mudarabah contract is:
Supposing δ the discount for the time of one loan, then the expected total profit 
of beneficiary at the state x and the time t in mudarabah contract is:
The bank profits for one period in mudarabah contract is:
The expected total profit of bank at the state x and the time t in mudarabah 
contract is:
The expected profit of beneficiary for one period in mudarabah contract is:
In addition, the expected profit of bank for one period in mudarabah contract is:
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If the expected profit of beneficiary for one period is equal to the expected 
profit of bank for one period, then we can calculate ε (the probability of the risk), 
if we fix ρ (the bank’s portion of profits):
3.2.2. Markov Chain Model of Murabahah Contract
In the model of murabahah contract, a beneficiary can ask one-unit goods over a 
period of time t. Three states are involved: A as the state of being an applicant, B a 
beneficiary, and D a debtor. The bank gives property to an applicant who becomes 
a beneficiary with probability γ, she then moves from state A to state B. If not, 
she stays at state A with probability 1-γ, she can apply again to get a property. A 
beneficiary can repay her property, in which she can stay at state B with probability 
β, and she can receive the other property. If she cannot reimburse, the bank will 
give her the times to repay, she becomes a debtor, she moves from state B to 
state D with probability 1-β. If she fails to reimburse again, the bank will give her 
opportunities again to repay, as she stays at the state D with probability ε. On the 
contrary, if she repays her property, she returns to state A with probability 1-ε and 
may request another property. The rules can be summarized in a Markov chain 
(Xt)t∈Ν with the set of states S≔{A,B,D}, where Xt∈S. The model can be illustrated by 
the following picture: 
(2)
Figure 2.
Markov Chain Model of Murabahah Contract
We can also describe the model into the transition matrix Pr:
The beneficiary receives the goods from the bank with the price K. The 
beneficiary must pay the bank, K + s. The amount of s depends on the contract as 
the bank profits.
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In the murabahah contract, we consider the financial flow function g:SxS→R. The 
beneficiary profits are the goods, which the beneficiary received. The beneficiary 
profits for one period in a murabahah contract are g(A, B) or g(B, B), signifying the 
beneficiary gaining profit when she passes state A to state B or when she passes 
state B to state B. 
The bank’s profits for one period in a murabahah contract is
The expected total profit of bank at state x and the time t in murabahah contract is
where δ is the discount for the time of one loan.
3.2.3. Proportion of Beneficiaries in The Population at Equilibrium 
An interesting consequence of the Markov chain for modeling of the dynamics 
is the study of the evolution of population distribution in various states, 
specifically the influence of the various parameters of the model to the proportion 
of beneficiaries in a population at equilibrium. We can use two propositions as 
applications of Perron-Frobenius theorem to calculate the proposition of each state 
in the population at equilibrium.
Proposition 1.
Let (Xt)t≥1 be above the Markov chain of mudarabah with the set of states S≔{A,B} and 
transition matrix Pd. The Markov chain has a unique equilibrium state π*,
The proportions of the two states tend to the equilibrium distribution π* when t tends ∞.
We can use this proposition to calculate the proportion of A and B.  The 
proportion of A  and the proportion of B 
Example:
The number of clients of mudarabah contract in a bank is 500. If γ=0.5 and ε=0.1, 
then the proportion of clients at state A = 0.17 (83 applicants) and the proportion of 
clients at state B = 0.83 (417 beneficiaries). 
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On the other hand, drawing on the Perron-Frobenius theorem, we can estimate 
certain parameters of the Markov chain model by using a historical loan of the 
beneficiary for many period of the time t. The bank can use the data to calculate 
the proportion of every state base on the Ergodic theorem, then we can estimate 
γ and ε.
Proposition 2.
Let (Xt)t≥1 be above the Markov chain of murabahah with the set of states S≔{A,B,D} and 
transition matrix Pr. The Markov chain has a unique equilibrium state π*,
The proportions of the two states tend to the equilibrium distribution π* when t tends ∞.
From this proposition, the proportion of A , 
the proportion of B , and the proportion of 
D 
Example:
The number of clients of murabahah contract in a bank is 500. If γ=0.8, β=0.7, and 
ε=0.1, then the proportion of clients at state A = 0.22 (110 applicants), the proportion 
of clients at state B = 0.58 (293 beneficiaries), and the proportion of clients at state 
D = 0.28 (97 debtors).
By using the Perron-Frobenius theorem and the Ergodic theorem, we can 
estimate γ, ε, and β:
3.2.4. Absence of Strategic Default
We take an idea introduced by Tedeschi (2006) which be called the absence of 
strategic default. Tedeschi explains a way to minimize the strategic default (moral 
hazard) by the beneficiary. We propose a mechanism that assures repayment in a 
mudabarah contract. It must be certain that the expected total profit of beneficiary 
when she can reimburse her loan must be more than the expected total profit 
of beneficiary when she cannot reimburse her loan and the beneficiary must 
reimburse the total money.
(3)
Furthermore, we can see a constraint of the parameters and study the 
consequences. We apply a proposition, which is proposed by Nahla et al. (2013) 
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about calculating the expected total profit of the beneficiary to see the value of the 
parameters, which respect the constraint of the absence of strategic default.
Where I is the identity matrix, P is the transition matrix, and Z(x)=Ε(f(X0,X1)|X0=x).
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
4.1. Results
4.1.1.  Simulation of Number of Loans
4.1.1.1. Simulation of Number of Loans  in Mudarabah  Contract
In a contract credit, both the bank and beneficiary expect that the beneficiary gets 
successful to reimburse her loan, so that the beneficiary can get a new loan. Such 
dynamics are expected to occur repeatedly.
In the mudarabah contract, we must maximize her proportion of B to maximize 
the number of loans. From proposition 1, , we must increase γ and/or 
decrease ε to a get large proportion of B. We decide to choose different values of 
γ in our simulations. In practice, the bank determines γ (the bank determines the 
number of applicants who will be accepted as a beneficiary).
We simulate different γ, γ=0.5 and γ=0.8, and we also choose ε=0.1, with the 
number of applicants is 500 and the number of periods t is 24. For each values of γ, 
we do 10 simulations to estimate the number of loans in a mudarabah contract, and 
then we calculate the average of each case. 
(4)
Figure 3.
Distribution of Number of Loans in Mudarabah Contract for γ=0.5
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Number of Loans
Number of Beneficiaries
A Markov Chain Model for Islamic Micro-Financing774
The first case γ=0.5, it means the number of applicants who become the 
beneficiary is 250. From the simulation, we get an average of modus of the 
number of loans is 18. It is obtained by 60 beneficiaries or 24.00% of the number of 
beneficiaries. 
Figure 4. 
Distribution of Number of Loans in Mudarabah Contract for γ=0.8
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The second case, γ=0.8 (the number of applicants who become the beneficiary 
is 400), we get an average of the modus of the number of loans is 19, obtained by 
94 beneficiaries (23.50% of beneficiaries). 
Table 1.
Comparison the Distributions of Number of Loans in Mudarabah  Contract for Two 
Different Values of γ
γ Number of Loans Number of Beneficiaries % of Beneficiaries
0.5 18 60 24.00
0.8 19 94 23.50
4.1.1.2. Simulation of Number of Loans  in Murabahah  Contract
In the murabahah model, the bank and the beneficiary hope, the beneficiary stays 
in state B, so we must maximize the proportion of B. From the proposition 2, the 
proportion of B is: , so we must increase γ and/
or β, and/or decrease ε to get a large proportion of B.
Similar to the previous simulations in mudarabah model, we choose different γ, 
such as γ=0.5 and γ=0.8. We also choose ε=0.1, with the number of applicants is 500 
and the number of periods t is 24. We perform 10 simulations for each γ to estimate 
the number of loans in murabahah contract. 
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In the case γ=0.5, we get an average of the modus of the number of loans is 11, 
it is obtained by 73 beneficiaries (29.20% of beneficiaries). 
Figure 5. 
Distribution of Number of Loans in Murabahah Contract for γ=0.5
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
Number of Loans
Number of Beneficiaries
Figure 6. 
Distribution of Number of Loans in Murabahah Contract for γ=0.8
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In the case γ=0.8, we get an average of the modus of the number of loans is 13, 
it is obtained by 82 beneficiaries (20.50% of beneficiaries). 
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4.1.2. Simulation of the Expected Total Profit
4.1.2.1. Simulation of the Expected Total Profit in Mudarabah Contract
We want to approximate the expected total profit of the beneficiary and the 
expected total profit of the bank in the mudarabah contract. We perform some 
simulations with the number of applicants is 500 and the number of periods t is 24. 
We do 10 simulations for each of two different values of γ (γ=0.5 and γ=0.8). The 
other parameters that we choose, ε=0.1, δ=0.9, ρ=0.3, K = RM100000, c = RM5000. 
If the beneficiary gets profit, Y(K) = RM145000, while if the beneficiary lost, Y(K) 
= RM85000. 
Table 2.
Comparison the Distributions of Number of Loans in Murabahah Contract for Two 
Different Values of γ
γ Maximum Number of Loans Number of Beneficiaries % of Beneficiaries
0.5 11 73 29.20
0.8 13 82 20.50
Figure 7. 
Distribution of the Expected Total Profit in Mudarabah Contract for γ=0.5
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For γ=0.5, the modus of the expected total profit of the beneficiary is 
RM134500, obtained by 31 beneficiaries (20.40% of beneficiaries), and the modus 
of the expected total profit of the bank is RM53500 that the bank obtains from 46 
beneficiaries (18.40% of beneficiaries). 
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For γ=0.8, the results are the average of modus of the expected total profit of 
the beneficiary is RM180000, obtained by 55 beneficiaries (13.75% of beneficiaries), 
and the average of modus of the expected total profit of the bank is RM72500 that 
the bank obtains from 56 beneficiaries (14.00% of beneficiaries). 
Figure 8. 
Distribution of the Expected Total Profit in Mudarabah Contract for γ=0.8
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Table 3. Comparison the Distributions of the Expected Total Profit in Mudarabah  
Contract for Two Different Values of γ
γ
Bank Beneficiary
Expected 
Total 
Profit 
(RM)
Number of 
Beneficiaries
% of 
Beneficiaries
Expected 
Total 
Profit
(RM)
Number of 
Beneficiaries
% of 
Beneficiaries
0.5 53500 46 18.40 134500 51 20.40
0.8 72500 56 14.00 180000 55 13.75
4.1.2.2. Simulation of the Expected Total Profit in Murabahah Contract
We make some simulations, which similar to the simulations of 
mudarabah contract, but only to estimate the expected total profit 
of the bank. We choose two different values of γ (γ=0.5 and γ=0.8), 
ε=0.1, β=0.7, δ=0.9, K = $100000, s = $20000, the number of applicants is 500, and the 
number of periods t is 24. 
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The simulations results for γ=0.5 the average of modus of the expected total 
profit of the bank is $233000, that the bank obtains from 71 beneficiaries (28.40% of 
the number of beneficiaries), and for γ=0.8, the average of modus of the expected 
total profit of the bank is $281000, from 85 beneficiaries (21.25% of beneficiaries). 
Figure 9.
Distribution of the Expected Total Profit in Murabahah Contract for γ=0.5
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Figure 10. 
Distribution of the Expected Total Profit in Murabahah Contract for γ=0.8
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4.1.3. Relation Between the Bank’s Portion of Profits and the Probability of Risk 
in Mudarabah Contract 
In a mudarabah contract, to avoid the risk due to adverse selection, the bank opts 
to determine the bank’s portion of profits (ρ), which benefits the bank. Of course, 
it is not desired by the beneficiary. It is important that the bank must find another 
solution for the problem.
In our model, if the expected total profit of the bank equal to the expected total 
profit of the beneficiary, we get a relation between the bank’s portion of profit and 
the probability of risk in a mudarabah contract. The bank can choose ρ to  avoid or 
reduce the risk (ε). By using the equation (2), the bank can choose ρ to estimate ε.
We can describe the relationship between ρ and  ε with the following picture: 
Table 4.
Comparison the Distributions of the Expected Total Profit in Murabahah  Contract 
for Two Different Values of γ
γ Expected Total Profit ($) Number of Beneficiaries % of Beneficiaries
0.5 233000 71 28.40
0.8 281000 85 21.25
Figure 11.
The Relation between the Bank’s Portion of Profits and the Probability of Risk
1
0.8
0.6
E
0.4
0.2
0
0 0.2 0.4
P
0.6 0.8 1
4.1.4. Absence of Strategic Default
We can apply formulas (3) and (4) to find the constraints of the probability of risk 
(ε) at the condition of the absence of strategic default in mudarabah contract. To 
avoid or reduce the risk due to strategic default (moral hazard), we want to find 
the constraints of ε at the condition of the absence of strategic default. We search 
the constraints of ε in two different values of γ (γ=0.5 and γ=0.8). We choose K = 
RM100000, Y(K) = RM140000, c = RM5000, δ=0.9, and ρ=0.3. 
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In the first case, γ=0.5, we find the constraints of ε at the condition of absence 
of strategic default is 0.20.
 Figure 12.
The Constraint of the Probability of Risk at Absence of Strategic Default for γ=0.5
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 Figure 13.
The Constraint of the Probability of Risk at Absence of Strategic Default for γ=0.8
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In the second case (γ=0.8), we find the constraint of ε at the condition of absence 
of strategic default is 0.05. Accordingly, there is a greater chance of strategic default 
for this case. 
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4.2. Analysis
In the simulations of the number of loans, if we compare the results of simulations 
of two different values of γ in mudarabah and murabahah contract (table 1 and table 
2), we can see that the percentage of beneficiaries gets the maximum number 
of loans, be greater when γ=0.5. It means the Islamic bank can decrease the 
probability of the applicant to be a beneficiary to increase the number of loans. By 
maximizing the number of loans, Islamic bank can ensure to reduce the risk due 
to moral hazard.
The results of the simulations of the expected total profit in mudarabah  and 
murabahah contract (Tables 3 and 4) show that the Islamic bank can decrease the 
probability of beneficiary applicants to increase the percentage of the number of 
beneficiaries who get the optimal profits in mudarabah  contract and increase the 
percentage of number of beneficiaries who give the optimal profits to the bank in 
mudarabah and murabahah  contracts. It can also assure reducing the risk due to 
moral hazard.
The Islamic bank must be more careful in selecting customers to reduce the 
number of applicants as the beneficiary to avoid adverse selection, so the Islamic 
bank can give more chance to beneficiaries to receive the credit to increase their 
profit, ultimately reducing the risk due to moral hazard. 
In the mudarabah contract, we can see the relation between the bank’s portion of 
profit and the probability of risk in Fig. 11. If the bank’s portion of profit increases 
than the probability of risk decreases and vice versa. If the Islamic bank chooses 
a large bank’s portion of profit, then the number of applicants decreases because 
the applicants’ hope the bank’s portion of the profit is small. This causes the risk of 
decreasing adverse selection or moral hazard. On the contrary, if the bank chooses 
a small portion of profit, the number of applicants could increase, causing the risk 
due to increased adverse selection or moral hazard.
Based on the absence of strategic default, we can see the comparison of the 
constraints of the risk at the condition of absence of strategic default for two 
different values of the probability of the applicant to be a beneficiary. If the bank 
increases the probability of the applicant to be a beneficiary, then the constraint of 
the probability of risk at the condition of the absence of strategic default decreases. 
As a result, the probability of risk due to decreased strategic default (moral hazard), 
when the bank decreases the probability of the applicant be a beneficiary.
V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
5.1. Conclusion
We have introduced the Markov chain model of Islamic micro-financing, especially 
in mudarabah and murabahah contracts. By using the models, the Islamic bank 
Table 5. Comparison of the Constraints of the Risk at the Condition of Absence of 
Strategic Default for Two Different Values of γ
γ Constraints of ε
0.5 0.20
0.8 0.05
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can determine the expected total profit of the beneficiary and the expected total 
profit of the bank and calculate the proportion of beneficiaries of each state at 
equilibrium condition. The Islamic bank can also formulate the condition of the 
absence of strategic default to avoid or reduce the risk in mudarabah contract. The 
Islamic bank can decrease the probability of the applicant be a beneficiary to avoid 
or reduce the adverse selection or moral hazard.
5.2. Recommendation
The Islamic bank must be more selective in selecting the beneficiary to avoid or 
reduce the risk due to adverse selection and moral hazard, as well as to optimize 
the profit of the beneficiary and the profit of bank. 
Further research could discuss a formula of the condition of absence of strategic 
default to avoid the risk in murabahah contract. We also propose to use the Markov 
Chain model in the other types of the contract of Islamic micro-financing to study 
the risk due to adverse selection and moral hazard. 
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